Abstract. In the present article we consider the conjunction fallacy, a well known cognitive heuristic experimentally tested in cognitive science, which occurs for intuitive judgments in situations of bounded rationality. We show that the quantum formalism can be used to describe in a very simple way this fallacy in terms of interference effect. We evidence that the quantum formalism leads quite naturally to violations of Bayes' rule when considering the estimated probability of the conjunction of two events. By defining the concept of maximal conjunction error, we find a good agreement with experimental results. Thus we suggest that in cognitive science the formalism of quantum mechanics can be used to describe a quantum regime, the bounded-rationality regime, where the cognitive heuristics are valid.
Introduction
This article addresses two main directions of research: the investigation of how the quantum formalism is compatible with Bayes' rule of classic probability theory, and the attempt to describe with the quantum formalism systems and situations very different from the microscopic particles. A number of attempts have been done to apply the formalism of quantum mechanics to domains of science different from the micro-world with applications to economics [1] , operations research and management sciences [2] and [3] , psychology and cognition [4] and [5] , game theory [6] , and language and artificial intelligence [7] . Quantum mechanics, for its counterintuitive predictions, seems to provide a good formalism to describe puzzling effects of contextuality. In the present article, we try to describe within the quantum formalism an important heuristic of cognitive science, the conjunction fallacy [8, 9] . This heuristic is valid in regime of bounded rationality, which is characterized by cognitive limitations of both knowledge and cognitive capacity. Bounded rationality [10] is a central theme in behavioral economics and psychology and it is concerned with the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences agents' decisions. Previous attempts to describe features connected with this heuristic in terms of quantum formalism have been done in [12] and in [13] .
This article is organized in order to be readable both from quantum physicists and from experts of cognitive science. In section 2 we introduce the basic notation of quantum mechanics, and we show in 2.3 that the quantum formalism describing two noncommuting observables leads to violations of Bayes' rule. In section 3 we describe the answers to a question in bounded-rationality regime in terms of vector state and density matrix of the quantum formalism. Finally, in section 4 we show how the quantum formalism can naturally describe the conjunction fallacy, and in section 6 we try to describe with the quantum formalism other fallacies
The main results of this article are: 1) tests on non-commuting observables lead to violations of Bayes' rule; 2) the opinion-state of an agent for simple questions with only two possible answers can be represented, in bounded-rationality regime, by a qubit state; 3) the different questions in bounded-rationality regime can be formally written as operators acting on the qubit states; 4) the explicit answer of an agent to a question in regime of bounded rationality can be described as a collapse of the opinion state onto an eigenvector of the corresponding operator; 5) the estimated probability relevant to a question A, when analyzed in terms of the probability relevant to a second question B (corresponding to a non-commuting operator) evidences the violation of Bayes' rule. The conjunction fallacy thus results as a consequence of this general fact. 6) The predictions of the model are consistent with the experimental tests on conjunction fallacy.
In conclusion, we present a very general and abstract formalism which seems to describe the heuristic of conjunction fallacy. We think that a similar study can be done for other heuristics of cognitive science (this will be presented in new papers). Thus these heuristics could be simple applications of a general theory describing the bounded-rationality regime, which probably will lead to new interesting predictions. This could confirm the hypothesis that the processes of intuitive judgement could involve mechanisms at a quantum level in the brain.
Quantum basic formalism
We first introduce the standard bra-ket notation usually used in quantum mechanics, introduced by Dirac [14] , and then the density matrix formalism. In particular, we focus our attention on the concept of qubit. In the simplest situation, a quantum state is defined by a ket |s , which is a vector in a complex separable Hilbert space H. If the dimension of H is 2, the state describes a qubit, which is the unit of quantum information. Any quantum system prepared identically to |s is described by the same ket |s .
In quantum mechanics, we call a measurable quantity an observable, mathematically described by an operator, for example A, with the important requirement that it is hermitian: A = A † , where A † is the conjugate transpose. In the case of a single qubit, any observable A has two real eigenvalues a 0 and a 1 and two corresponding eigenvectors |a 0 and |a 1 . Another property of hermitian operators is that its eigenvectors, if normalized, form an orthonormal basis, that is
where i, j = 0, 1 and δ(i, j) is the Kroneker delta, equal to 1 if i = j and null otherwise. Given such a basis in the Hilbert space, we can write them in components as
representing the quantum analogue to the two possible values 0 and 1 of a classical bit. An important difference is that in the quantum case a state can be in a linear superposition of 0 and 1, that is
with s 0 and s 1 complex numbers. We also say that the state |s is a superposition of the eigenstates |a i . In the vector representation generated by formula (2) in the chosen basis, the ket |s and its dual vector, the bra s|, can be written respectively as
Another mathematical object, which is important in order to describe probabilities, is the inner product, also called braket. In general, the inner product of two kets |s and |s ′ can be written, in the basis of the obsevable A, as s|s
are the components of |s ′ in the same basis. Thus the inner product of |s and its dual vector is s|s = |s 0 | 2 + |s 1 | 2 , and it is equal to 1 if the vector is normalized. Finally, |s i | 2 = | a i |s | 2 is the probability P (a i ) that the measure on the observable A has the outcome i = 0, 1. The state |s is called a pure state, and describes a quantum state for which the preparation is complete: all the information which can be theorically provided have been used.
In the most general case, a quantum state is described by the density matrix ρ, which is an hermitian operator acting on H. The density matrix ρ describes in general a mixed state, that is a state for which the preparation is not completely determined. For example, the state may be in the preparation |s 1 with a probability P 1 , and in the preparation |s 2 with a probability P 2 (the two vectors may be not orthogonal). We also say that the the mixed state is a (statistical) mixture of the two states (or of the two preparations):
In the particular case where there is only one P i = 1, we have ρ = |s s|, that is a pure state: thus the density matrix of a pure state is a projector. The opposite situation is when the eigenvalues of the density matrix are all equal. In the single-qubit example, they are both 1/2, and the resulting operator is the identity matrix acting on the Hilbert space H:
The resulting state is called maximally mixed, and can be considered as the situation where the actual knowledge of the state is null.
Probability and mean value
The elements of the single-qubit density matrix ρ can be expressed in the basis of A, with i, j = 0, 1, as
where the diagonal elements ρ i,i represent the probability P (a i ) to measure a certain value a i of the relevant observable. An equivalent expression of these probabilities can be written in terms of the trace-matrix operation:
This formula is the most general expression of the probability to measure a value a i of an observable, when operating on quantum systems identically prepared in the state ρ. The formalism of the density matrix helps us to write in the most general form the mean value of an observable A as
which becomes, by using formula (7) and the basis vectors of A, A = i a i P (a i ).
Collapse of the state vector
One of the axioms [14] of quantum mechanics states that, given an initial mixed state ρ and an observable A acting on a discrete Hilbert space, we can define from the eigenvectors {|a i } of A the projection operators {|a i a i |}, where for a single qubit i = 0, 1. Thus if the measure of the observable A is the eigenvalue a i , the state updates as
This general formula is valid for an orthonormal basis {|a i }, and defines the collapse of the initial state onto the state vector |a i . Of course, after the measurement, a suitable unitary operation can change the resulting (collapsed) state. At a first analysis, the collapse of the state may seem quite obvious. In fact, the initial probability distribution P (a j ) given by equation (8) corresponding to the initial state ρ, changes, by performing simple calculations, into
This means that, after measuring a certain value a i of A, the probability that the observable actually has another value a j = a i is null. This fact is valid also in classic probability theory. Nevertheless, we will show in the next subsection that the collapse leads to violation of classic laws of probability theory when considering more than one observable.
Non-commuting operators and Bayes' rule
In quantum mechanics the operators associated to the observables may not commute: for example, given two operators A and B, acting on the same Hilbert space H, the ordered product A B can be different from B A: in this case the two operators do not commute and we write [ A, B] = 0, where [ A, B] = A B − B A is the commutator of the two observables. The consequences of this fact are very important, and lead to violation of Bayes' rule. Let us consider for simplicity a single-quit system and the eigenvectors {|a i } and {|b i } of A and B respectively (with i = 0, 1). The probability of measuring the value a i or b i for the observables A or B respectively is given by equation (8) , that is:
We now consider the conditional probability P (b j |a i ), defined as the probability to measure the observable B with value b j , given the occurrence of a measurement of A with value a i . In quantum mechanics, the occurrence of a measurement of A with result a i means that the actual state is |a i , independently from the initial state before the measurement. This is a consequence of the quantum collapse, and leads to many differences from the classic case. In quantum mechanics thus we have that
Conditional probabilities in quantum mechanics have other particular features: from the resolution of identity |a 0 a 0 | + |a 0 a 0 | = I (where I is the identity matrix), we have that P (b 1 |a 0 ) + P (b 1 |a 1 ) = 1 and P (b 0 |a 0 ) + P (b 0 |a 1 ) = 1, from which we have in general that P (b 0 |a 0 ) = P (b 1 |a 1 ) and P (b 1 |a 0 ) = P (b 0 |a 1 ). These properties are not valid in general in classic probability theory, and can be responsible of the inverse fallacy [16] . In classical probability theory two observables are statistically independent when P (b j |a i ) = P (b j ): in the quantum formalism this is impossible in general.
Let us now consider the Bayes' rule, which defines the joint probability to measure contemporarily the values a i and b j for observables A and B respectively:
This equation is very important in classical probability theory, since it links the joint probabilities relevant to A and B to the conditional probabilities. In quantum mechanics one can not measure contemporarily two non-commuting operators. This means that the joint probability P (a i , b j ) can not be univocally defined. What we can rigorously define is
where P (a i → b j ) is the probability to measure a i for the observable A and then the answer b j for the observable B. We call P (a i → b j ) the consecutive probability to measure a i and then b j . From a formal point of view, the impossibility to define univocally a joint probability is evidenced from the fact that, by using the equations (12) and (13), we have in general that
Equation (16) evidences that in quantum mechanics the Bayes' rule is violated. Many of the paradoxical results of quantum mechanics are due to this violation. In the present article, we will focus our attention on the conjunction fallacy, which we will study in the next sections.
Bounded rationality and Hilbert spaces
The bounded rationality [10] is a property of an agent (a person which makes decisions) that behaves in a manner that is nearly optimal with respect to its goals and resources. In general, an agent acts in bounded-rationality regime when there is a limited time in which to make decisions, or when he is also limited by schemas and other decisional limitations. As a result, the decisions are not fully thought through and they are rational only within limits such as time and cognitive capability. There are two major causes of bounded rationality, the limitations of the human mind, and the structure within which the mind operates. This impacts decision models that assume us to be fully rational: for example when calculating expected utility, it happens that people do not make the best choices. Since the effects of bounded rationality are counterintuitive and may violate the classical probability theory (and the Bayes' rule), we will often speak of bounded-rationality regime as the set of situations where the bounded rationality is an actual property. We will show that some typical behaviors of the bounded-rationality regime can be described in a very effective way by the quantum formalism. We will study the opinion state of agents having the same initial information in terms of estimated probabilities. In particular, we will assume that the opinion state of an agent can be represented as a qubit state, that is in terms of a density matrix ρ or, in simple cases, of a ket |s in a Hilbert space H of dimension 2. As in quantum mechanics experiments, it is important to define carefully the preparation of the opinion state. Any previous information given to an agent before performing a test can be considered as the preparation of the opinion state. When we repeat a test on more agents, it is important that their opinion state is (at least in theory) identically prepared. We note here that it is not easy to prepare the opinion state of a number of people in an identical state. Nevertheless, the quantum formalism can help us with the concept of mixed state.
The basic test in the context of bounded rationality is a question. We consider a question A for which the possible answers can only be 0 or 1 (false or true), and we associate it to an operator A acting on the Hilbert space H. Like in quantum mechanics, the question A is an observable, in the sense that we can observe an answer: thus, when speaking of questions, we will consider directly the associated operator A. The answers 0 and 1 are associated to the eigenvalues a 0 = 0 and a 1 = 1 of A, while the eigenvectors |a 0 and |a 1 correspond to the opinion states relevant to the answers 0 and 1 respectively:
The eigenvectors |a 0 and |a 1 have a very precise meaning: if the opinion state of an agent can be described for example by |a 1 , this means that the answer to the question A is 1 with certainty. If we repeat the same question to many agents in the same opinion state (thus identically prepared), each agent will give the same answer 1. If instead the opinion state about the question is definitely 0, then we have the eigenvector |a 0 . Any observable can be written in the basis of its eigenvectors as A = i a i |a i a i |.
A superposition of the opinion states |a i about question A is, like in equation (3), |s = s 0 |a 0 + s 1 |a 1 , where |s i | 2 = | a i |s | 2 is the probability P (a i ) that the agent gives an answer i = 0, 1 to the question A. In the most general case, the opinion state can be represented as a density matrix ρ. The probability that the answer to the question A is a i is given by equation (8): P (a i ) = T r(ρ|a i a i |).
We note that the formalism introduced is the same used to describe questions in regime of rational ignorance [3] , where people choose to remain uninformed about a question A. In fact, the bounded rationality can be considered as a more general situation than the rational ignorance, where the question is preceded by some additional information.
The conjunction fallacy
The conjunction fallacy is a well known cognitive heuristic which occurs in bounded rationality when some specific conditions are assumed to be more probable than the general ones. More precisely, many people tend to ascribe higher probabilities to the conjunction of two events than to one of the single events. The most often-cited example of this fallacy found by Tversky and Kahneman [8] is the case of Linda, which we will consider carefully in the present article. The test is preceded by a brief personality sketch: Linda was a philosophy major. She is bright and concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice. After this preparation, the agents are asked if they judge more probable that Linda is a bank teller or a feminist bank teller. The surprising result is that subjects judge more probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than a bank teller, even if this is in contrast with classical probability theory.
According to Tversky and Kahneman, the explanation of this fallacy is that subjects assess Linda to be more typical of feminist bank teller than of bank teller, and that this assessment influences their probability judgments. As Kahneman and Tversky have repeatedly pointed out, however, the intuition of typicality differs structurally from the mathematical properties of a classic probability measure. There is no fallacy in considering Linda more typical of a feminist bank teller than of bank teller, there is only a conjunction effect. The conjunction fallacy instead lies in equating the probability order to the typicality order. A more thorough test of the similarity hypothesis has been described in [9] : the stimuli were 14 brief personality sketches, one of which was the Linda sketch and others of which were new. For each sketch, they constructed an incompatible conjunction, A-and-B, and a compatible conjunction, A-and-C, such that A was the same representative outcome for both conjunctions (e.g., Linda is a feminist), B was an unrepresentative outcome (e.g., Linda is a bank teller), and C was a representative outcome (e.g., Linda is a teacher). In terms of the Linda example, A-and-B would be "Linda is a feminist bank teller" and A-and-C would be "Linda is a feminist teacher." One sample of subjects rated the typicality of the propositions, B/A-and-B, C/A-and-C, and a different sample of subjects rated the probability of these same propositions. The result is that exists a positive correlation between the conjunction effect (involving the typicality) and the conjunction fallacy (involving the probability).
The main competitors to the representativeness explanation of conjunction errors are various probability combination models. The simplest weighted averaging model asserts that P (A, B) =
, where v 1 and v 2 are positive weights (Wyer, 1976) . A modified version of this model uses belief strengths, and not probabilities. However, the main feature of this model is that it leads to P (A) > P (A, B) > P (B). These combination models have been modified in order to avoid some inconsistencies of the model with the experiments. Yates and Carlson ( [20] ) proposed an alternative theory of conjunction errors according to which these errors result from the application of improper mental rules when combining the probabilities of individual propositions.
The results of Table III show that conjunction errors may occur also when events A and B are semantically unrelated: it is difficult to see how the judged probability of the conjunction could be based on the representativeness, i.e., the typicality, of the conceptual combination. Thus they proposed a signed summation model where the belief strength of a conjunction is a sum of the strengths of its components S(A, B) = S(A) + S(B), (the belief strength scale S is allowed to take on either positive or negative values). This model seem to be the most similar to our quantum explanation.
In general, we consider two dichotomous questions A and B, with possible answers a 0 , a 1 and b 0 , b 1 . The typical experiments of [8] and [9] consist in a preparation of the opinion state, which provides some information to the agent, and the following question: what is more probable or frequent between a 1 and a 1 -and-b 1 ? The agents manifest in all these experiments a strict preference for the answer a 1 -and-b 1 : this evidences the conjunction fallacy, since the Bayes' rule (14) entails that
In other words, the conjunction of two events a 1 and b 1 is always less probable than of one of two events. Nonetheless, the agents often consider more likely a 1 -and-b 1 than a 1 . We now introduce the quantum formalism in order to show that the conjunction fallacy can be described and interpreted in such a formalism. In particular, we consider two operators A and B, associated respectively to the questions A and B. Since A and B are dichotomous questions, we can describe the opinion state of agents as vectors in a two-dimensional Hilbert space. Both the eigenvectors of A and B, defined by equation (17) , form two orthonormal bases of the Hilbert space H. Thus we can express the eigenvectors of A in the basis of the eigenvectors of B, obtaining the general equations:
and vice-versa
The transformations above are a change of basis, which can be described in terms of a special unitary operator U (which preserves the normalization) such that ij U ij |a i = |b j . The transformation is defined uniquely by the three independent parameters P (b 1 |a 1 ), φ and ξ: in fact the other parameter P (b 1 |a 0 ) = 1−P (b 1 |a 1 ) is not independent, as noted in section (2.3). The parameters φ and ξ are useful when considering pure states and are important in interference effects. Let us now consider as the initial state the following superposition
where φ a represents the phase relevant to the superposition of the vectors |a i . This pure state describes correctly the probabilities for A, P (a i ) = | s|a i | 2 . By using equation (19) , we can express this state in the basis of B, obtaining
We now consider the probabilities P (a 1 ), P (b 1 ) and the conditional probability P (a 1 |b 1 ): from equation (22), we have that
The presence of the last term, known as the interference term I(s, A) can produce conjunction fallacy effects: in fact, if we impose that P (a 0 )P (b 1 |a 0 ) + I(s, A) < 0, we have P (b 1 ) < P (a 1 )P (b 1 |a 1 ). Thus the sign and the weight of the interference term can determine the conjunction fallacy, while the parameter φ + ξ − φ a can give to this effect more or less strength. A positive interference term enhances the prevalence of P (b 1 ) on P (a 1 , b 1 ), which can be considered a reverse conjunction fallacy.
It must be noted that the quantum explanation of the conjunction fallacy evidences that the interference term can make P (b 1 ) lower than P (a 1 )P (b 1 |a 1 ) = P (a 1 → b 1 ). On the contrary, P (b 1 ) is always greater than P (b 1 )P (a 1 |b 1 ) = P (b 1 → a 1 ). Thus we add the hypothesis that, when agents have to judge the probabilities of b 1 and a 1 -and-b 1 , they first consider the element that differences the two situations (a 1 ) and then the composite situation. This hypothesis is able to explain why the agents compare in their judgements P (b 1 ) and P (a 1 → b 1 ).
The conjunction fallacy can appear also when comparing a 1 and a 1 -and-b 1 , if we write the same initial state in the basis of B
The probability P (a 1 ) can be written, with similar calculations, as
evidencing once again an interference term I(s, B). If we want the presence of conjunction fallacy P (a 1 ) < P (b 1 )P (a 1 |b 1 ), we impose P (b 0 )P (a 1 |b 0 ) + I(s, B) < 0. We thus define the conjunction error as
If the both the conditions (26) and (27) are verified, we have a double conjunction fallacy.
Experimental results
The model we have developed, once we know the independent parameters P (a 1 ), P (a 1 |b 1 ), φ + ξ − φ a , allows to predict with certainty if there is or not a conjunction fallacy. However the experimental results evidence that not all the agents manifest a conjunction fallacy, which can be associated to a probability. This can be explained with the fact that in general we have an incomplete preparation of the opinion state, which determines a mixed state: we could have some agents into a state |s 1 with probability P 1 and some other agents into the state |s 2 with probability P 2 , etc... The resulting opinion state is in general a mixed state ρ = i P i |s i where each |s i can have different P (a 1 ) and φ a . We thus have different types of interference terms, determining in an independent way the conjunction fallacy with probabilities P i respectively. We define the mean conjunction error ∆ mean (A, B) = i ∆(A, B, s i )P i : it could be null, even if some agents may manifest the conjunction fallacy, meaning that the perceived compatibility of two events is not similar for the agents in the experiment.
We can decompose the density matrix into ρ
′′ j | where the states |s ′ i manifest conjunction fallacy, while the others do not manifest it. Thus the probability that an agent will exhibit a conjunction fallacy, being prepared in the state ρ, is i P ′ i . In the next subsections, we will investigate the mean conjunction errors and the probability of conjunction errors. In particular, we consider the probabilities P (a 1 )/P (b 1 ) with the following couples: HH, HL, LH, LL, where H means that the corresponding probability is high (> 0.5), while L is low (< 0.5). For example the couple HH describes a situation where both P (a 1 ) and P (b 1 ) are > 0.5.
Mean conjunction error
One of the main experimental results in the tests of the conjunction fallacy is the mean conjunction error P (a 1 , b 1 ) − P (b 1 ): in [9] it is found that there are greater mean conjunction errors in situations HL than in HH. In particular, the maximal error reported in [9] (table I) for HL is 0.27, while for HH is 0.09. These experimental results of [9] can be explained in the following way: we define the condition of maximal conjunction error compatible with the parameters P (a 1 ) and P (b 1 |a 1 ) the values of φ + ξ − φ a such that cos(φ + ξ − φ a ) = −1. By imposing the maximal conjunction error condition we obtain the equation
where ∆ max (A, B) is the maximal conjunction error. This difference is a measure of the strength of the maximal conjunction error compatible with the parameters P (a 1 ) and P (b 1 |a 1 ), which may be lowered by different relative phase factor. In figure 1 we show the maximal conjunction error for three different values of P (b 1 |a 1 ) (0.1, 0.5 and 0.9). We note that high/low values of P (b 1 |a 1 ) entail a correlation/anticorrelation between P (a 1 ) and P (b 1 ) respectively. Moreover, condition (28) and figure 1 entail that the combination LH does not manifest conjunction errors (the maximal conjunction error is positive in the left part of the left panel in figure 1 ), while the other couples allow for conjunction errors. HH and LL couples produce lower maximal errors (0.17 and 0.23 respectively) than HL couples (0.3). Now we consider the effect of the phase factor cos(φ + ξ −φ a ): the conjunction error can be lowered (negative factor), or can it be deleted (null or positive factor). Thus the factor cos(φ + ξ − φ a ) can be interpreted as a psychologic parameter of the the opinion state of agents which describes how two events are considered antithetical. For example, if two events are considered antithetical, we have a strongly negative interference term. Our description could be connected to the concept of incompatibility of two events, introduced by [9] : two events are incompatible when we have a situation HL and the phase factor is negative. It is important to distinguish this kind of incompatibility from the incompatibility of quantum observables (that is the non-commutativity). It is important to note that the phase factor, because of its psychologic nature may be extremely variable even for similar preparations.
Thus the results of [9] can be explained by noting that for HL couples the predicted maximal conjunction error (0.3) can be slightly lowered by the phase factor in order to be similar to the results of [9] (0.27). Analogously, for HH situations the maximal conjunction error predicted by the model (0.17) is lowered by the phase factor in order to be similar to the experimental value 0.9. We conclude that the phase factor is more similar to -1 in the HL case, confirming that the two events are considered antithetically.
The case LH, according to our model, does not produce conjunction error, even without the effect of the phase factor. This seems to be in accordance with experimental results, even if there is no general agreement about this fact.
Percentage of conjunction errors
Differently form [9] , the papers [8, 20] study the percentage of agents which judge P (a 1 , b 1 ) greater than P (b 1 ). In [20] it is found that the fraction of agents that exhibit single conjunction errors is greater for HL situations (0.67) than for HH and LL (0.15 and 0.27 respectively). On the contrary, double conjunction errors happen more frequently for HH (0.30).
Our formalism can explain these results by decomposing the density matrix into
′′ j where the states |s ′ i manifest conjunction fallacy, while the others do not manifest it. Thus the probability that an agent will exhibit a conjunction fallacy, being prepared in the state ρ, is i P ′ i . This means that in HL situations the states involved in the mixed state evidence strongly negative phase factor with more probability than for HH and LL, consistently with the results for the mean conjunction errors.
We now consider the occurrence of double conjunction errors, which means that P (b 1 ) < P (a 1 → b 1 ) and P (a 1 ) < P (b 1 → a 1 ). Equation (25) entails a condition of maximal conjunction error similar to equation (28), that is
This condition entails that the allowed couples of probability P (a 1 )/P (b 1 ) for which there is a not-null maximal conjunction error is HH, LH and LL. Thus the conditions HL and LH do not allow for double conjunction errors. This can explain the results presented in [19, 20] , where several probability combination models for conjunction errors are presented: double conjunction errors can not occur simultaneously for HL or LH situations (maximal percentage 4.5%).
Numerical example
We consider again the example of Linda, by considering two questions A: is Linda feminist? and B: is Linda a bankteller? for which the experiments indicate a probability P (b 1 ) = 0.241 and P (a 1 )P (b 1 |a 1 ) = 0.439. Moreover, we know that P (a 1 ) is high, since the description of Linda is very representative of a feminist. In the quantum formalism, there are many different states describing such a situation.
If we consider the pure state P (a 0 )|a 0 + e iφa P (a 1 )|a 1 , we can choose the parameters P (a 1 ) and φ + ξ − φ a such that equation (23) is valid. For example, let be P (a 1 ) = 0.9, from which we have P (b 1 |a 1 ) = 0.48: thus P (a 0 )P (b 1 |a 0 ) = 0.05. Let us now evaluate the interference term 2 P (a 0 )P (b 1 |a 0 )P (a 1 )P (b 1 |a 1 )cos(φ + ξ − φ a ), which is 0.3cos(φ + ξ − φ a ). Thus from equation (23) we have 0.241 = 0.05 + 0.439 + 0.3cos(φ + ξ − φ a ), which entails cos(φ + ξ − φ a ) = −0.827. This confirms the prediction of our model, which evidences the presence of conjunction errors for situations HL and a strongly negative phase factor for incompatible events. In this case we have built a pure state, but we could write more complex mixed states, manifesting the conjunction error only with a certain probability.
Other fallacies
The rich mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and the interference effects allow us to predict or explain other fallacies in the bounded-rationality regime. For example, 1) the ordering effects, 2) the disjunction effect, 3) the conditional probability fallacy, 4) the framing effect and 5) the uncertainty effect. We give in this final section a brief description of these effects, which will be described in other articles.
1) In the bounded-rationality regime, the order with which we consider two questions A and B is important (see also the case of rational ignorance [3] ). Similarly to the repeated Stern-Gerlach experiment, we ask a question relevant to the operator A, then a second question relevant to the non-commuting operator B and finally again A. Equation (15) defines the probability that the result of the second question is b j , given a i . But the third measure leads to a non-null probability P (a k → b j ) for k = i: in other words the third question can give a result for the observable A different from the first. The bounded rationality situation has manifested an irrational behavior of the agent. The question A has been asked two times, but what has been changed is the context. The opinion state of the agent in the test has evidenced a contextuality effect. Thus it has great importance, in bounded rationality, also the temporal order of the different questions.
2) The disjunction effect is an intriguing phenomenon discovered by Tversky and Shafir [17] with important consequences in modelling the interactions between inference and decision. This effect, like the conjunction fallacy, considers the probabilities relevant to two events which can be associated to two non-commuting operators. A first attempt to give an explanation of the effect within the quantum formalism has been given by [22] , by considering the two questions relevant to two different Hilbert spaces. The consequences of this approach are that we obtain an entangled state, but also that the evolution of the initial state can lead to a state which contradicts the initial information given to the agent. A new explanation of the disjunction effect will be given in a separate paper: here we only observe that the conjunction fallacy can be applied to show how the perceived probability P (b 1 ) (for example) can be lower than P (a 0 )P (b 1 |a 0 ) + P (a 1 )P (b 1 |a 1 ), because the interference terms like in equation (23) may appear.
3) The framing effects may have a similar explanation of the conjunction and disjunction effect: the interference terms in fact are able to lower the probability P (b j ) when the initial information lead to an opportune pure state in a basis relevant to a non-commuting operator.
4) The conditional probability fallacy is the assumption that P (a j |b i ) = P (b i |a j ). In classical probability theory this is not valid in general, while in quantum mechanics it is always true, as can be seen from equation (13) .
5) Finally we make the hypothesis of the existence of an uncertainty effect, which is a consequence of the well-known uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics. The experimental data of [9] show that a not-null percentage of agents in the tests fails in the implication X −and−Y |= X, Y . We argue that this percentage may change, depending on the commutator of the associated operators X, Y . The uncertainty principle in Hilbert spaces with discrete dimension has been formulated in a more general form [23] : given the uncertainty of an observable X, defined as the statistical variance of the randomly fluctuating measurement outcomes δ 2 ( A) = A 2 − A 2 , the local uncertainty relations [23] state that, for any set { X, Y , Z, ...} of non-commuting operators, there exist a non-trivial limit U such that δ 2 ( X) + δ 2 ( Y ) + δ 2 ( Z) + ... ≥ U. This new form of the uncertainty principle may apply to bounded-rationality regime, leading to predictions similar to those cited of [9] : even if we try to prepare the opinion state of agents such that the uncertainty of X and Y is null, the sum δ 2 ( X) + δ 2 ( Y ) can not be null.
All these paradoxical effects in general are due to the usual belief that we can assign pre-defined elements of reality to individual observables also in regime of bounded rationality. In a classical situation, if we ask to an agent the two questions associated to the observables A, B, we can consider simultaneously the two answers (a i , b j ), and we can study the joint probability P (a i , b j ). In a bounded rationality regime, instead, this is not possible if the related observables are non-commuting. We say that the answers to these questions can not be known contemporarily, thus giving an important limit to the complete knowledge of the opinion state of an agent in bounded-rationality regime.
This effect in microscopic world is called quantum contextuality [15] , and evidences, for any measurement, the influence of other non-commuting observables previously considered.
Conclusions
This article, addressed both to quantum physicists and to experts of cognitive science, evidences the incompatibility of quantum formalism with Bayes' rule of classic probability theory, by deriving the violation of equation (18) in bounded-rationality regime. In particular, we use mathematical objects like vector state and density matrix to describe the opinion state of agents, and hermitian operators for the questions: in section 4 we show that the conjunction fallacy can be explained as an interference effect when two different questions (relevant to two non-commuting operators) are considered.
This seems to confirm the comment of [9] , for which the conjunction fallacy seems to involve failure to coordinate the logical structure of events with first impressions about chance. The first impressions about chance may be encoded in the quantum phase, which leads to interference effects. In fact, we have seen that state (21) do not differ for the statistical predictions of A, but for the presence of a phase, which gives us the information of how the same superposition of states is considered initially by the agent.
Thus we conclude that the conjunction fallacy can be considered as a natural consequence of the quantum formalism used to describe the bounded-rationality regime. By the way, the formalism introduced does not only give an explanation of the fallacy, but also has a predictive character: in fact, we have predicted a reverse conjunction fallacy, for which the probability of the conjunction of two events is much less than the probability assigned to a single event. Moreover, in section 6 we propose other effects which are consequences of the formalism introduced.
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